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Abstract: The analysis allowed the determination in general of the consumer’s surplus or of the 
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1. Introduction 
Monopoly is a market situation where there is a single bidder of an unsubstituted 
good and a sufficient number of consumers. 
The existence of monopoly imply absence of competition between production 
companies, the only ones who can influence a lesser or greater price being the 
buyers. 
We list some main categories of monopoly, namely: 
 natural monopoly – as a result of the realization of inventions or possession of 
scarce resources or prohibitive for other potential competitors. Usually, such a 
monopoly has not a very long life because on the one hand, technological 
progress can give birth to new inventions to cancel the advantage of generating 
monopoly or, on the other hand, reallocation of resources for various reasons. In 
this type of monopoly, the long-term average cost is a decreasing function, 
contrary to the situation encountered in the perfect competition. 
                                                        
1 Associate Professor, PhD, Danubius University of Galati, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Romania, 
Address: 3 Galati Blvd, Galati, Romania, tel: +40372 361 102, fax: +40372 361 290, Corresponding 
author: catalin_angelo_ioan@univ-danubius.ro 
2 Assistant Professor, PhD in progress, Danubius University of Galati, Faculty of Economic Sciences, 
Romania, Address: 3 Galati Blvd, Galati, Romania, tel: +40372 361 102, fax: +40372 361 290, e-
mail: gina_ioan@univ-danubius.ro 
AUDŒ, Vol 7, no 4, pp. 101-112 
 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                         Vol 8, no. 3/2012 
 
 102 
 public monopoly – represented by state-owned companies, generated mostly 
by controlling prices or monitoring of hazardous activities. We meet such a 
monopoly, usually within companies providing essential services to society, 
such as railway companies and/or air, distribution companies (electric, gas, 
nuclear, wind etc.). , water distribution companies and/or heat etc. 
 monopoly as a final result of the competition – when, one by one, 
competitors are removed from the market. 
In the market monopoly, the price set will not follows the equilibrium law, the 
monopolist having the possibility of relatively unilaterally adjust to maximize its 
profits. On the other hand, an excessive increase in price implies a decline in 
production due to its sale entirely impossible. 
The uninterchangeably of the product is essential, because if there is another 
product that could replace the original one, the buyers will move the request to this, 
the monopolistic company thus reducing the market outlet. 
 
2. An Overview of Monopoly 
Before beginning our analysis on the price of a good sold under monopoly 
situation, let recall the main costs of production, where we have noted Cm – the 
marginal cost, CT – the total cost, CTM – the average total cost. 
 
Figure 1. Long-term costs 
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The action of monopolist is so effective for Q[Q1,Q2] (Q1 – the minimum point of 
Cm, Q2 – the CTM’s minimum point) therefore on the part where the marginal cost 
is increasing, but the average total is decreasing. 
We know that at a sale price of output Q, we have: (Q)=p(Q)Q-CT(Q) where, 
from the condition of extreme profit ( )Q(' =0) implies: 










p,Q
1
1)Q(p)Q(Cm   
where p,Q =
Q
p
dp
dQ
  is the coefficient of elasticity of demand in relation to price. 
We will assume that the good is normal, so p,Q 0. 
On the other hand, we know that the marginal income Vm(Q)=










p,Q
1
1)Q(p . 
If 
p,Q
1
1

 0
p,Q
 -1 then Vm(Q)0. How any company production is at a 
positive marginal cost we have that Vm(Q)=Cm(Q)0 so contradiction. 
If 
p,Q
 -1 then 
p,Q
1
1

 0 having Vm(Q)0.  If the equation Cm(Q)=Vm(Q) has 
the solution Q0 then Q=Q0 is the output at which the monopolist will maximize its 
profit, the price of production being p0=Cm(Q0). Therefore, to maximize its profit, 
the monopolist will run as long as the elasticity of production is less than -1, so the 
demand is elastic. 
Also, as Vm=p’(Q)Q+p(Q)p(Q) (for a normal good p’(Q)0) we obtain that 
p
*
=p(Q0)p0, so the price that consumers are willing to offer is greater than those of 
production. As a result, the revenue of monopolist are V=p
*
Q0. At a such level of 
production, the average total cost CTM(Q0) is greater than p0 because the 
production zone is under its minimum and less than p
*
. The monopolist profit is 
therefore: 
(Q0)=(p
*
-CTM(Q0))Q0 
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Figure 2. The profit of the monopolist 
Let us note now Pp(Q)= 
)Q(Cm
)Q(p
 - the market power of the company 
corresponding to the production Q. We note that a value higher than one of Pp is a 
price that exceeds the marginal cost and thus is providing additional profit. But we 
have: Pp(Q)=
1p,Q
p,Q


. 
Considering the function f:(-,-1)(-1,0]R, f(x)= 
1x
x

 we have f’(x)=
2)1x(
1

0 therefore f is strictly increasing. As )x(flim
x 
=1, )x(flim
1x
1x


=, )x(flim
1x
1x


=-, 
f(0)=0, follows that f(x)(1,) x(-,-1) and f(x)(-,0)  
x(-1,0]. In particular, for x = p,Q  we have that Pp(Q)(1,)  p,Q (-,-1) and 
Pp(Q)(-,0) 
p,Q
 (-1,0]. 
Following these considerations, it result that for a demand increasingly more 
elastic, the monopolist can raise price increasing more than the marginal cost of 
production. 
Similarly, we define the firm’s pricing power (the Lerner index), corresponding to 
the production Q, as: L(Q)=
)Q(p
)Q(Cm)Q(p 
. We have: 
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L(Q)=
)Q(p
)Q(Cm)Q(p 
=1-
)Q(p
)Q(Cm
=1-
)Q(Pp
1
=
p,Q
1

  
The power price is the price relative deviation of the price monopoly in relation to 
the those coming from perfect competition (Cm(Q)). Notice that at a demand 
becoming more elastic ( p,Q -1) L tends to zero. 
In the monopolistic market, the production Q0 where the monopolist will maximize 
its profit, is thus a solution of the equation Cm(Q)=Vm(Q), the output price being 
p0=Cm(Q0). The selling price of the product is p
*
=p(Q0). As V(Q)=p(Q)Q we have 
that Vm(Q)=p’(Q)Q+p(Q) therefore Q0 satisfy the equality: Cm(Q0)=p’(Q0)Q0+ 
p(Q0). 
In this case, the consumer surplus (in the case of monopoly) is the curvilinear 
triangle area FAp
*
 i.e.: 
Sd,m= 0
*
Q
0
QpdQ)Q(p
0
  
Similarly, the excess of the monopolist (in the case of monopoly) is the curvilinear 
quadrilateral area p
*
ACD: 
Ss,m= 
0Q
0
0
* dQ)Q(CmQp  
 
Figure 3. Allocative inefficiency 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                         Vol 8, no. 3/2012 
 
 106 
The total surplus (in the case of monopoly) is the sum of the two surpluses, 
namely: 
Sm=Sd,m+Ss,m=   
0Q
0
dQ)Q(Cm)Q(p  
As L(Q)=
)Q(p
)Q(Cm)Q(p 
 follows that p(Q)-Cm(Q)=L(Q)p(Q)=
p,Q
)Q(p

 . 
The total surplus can be written thus: 
Sm= 


0Q
0 p,Q
dQ
)Q(p
 
If the manufacturer would operate under perfect competition, the equilibrium 
production would satisfy the relationship Cm(Q)=p(Q). Let Q  and p  - the 
production and the price equilibrium in this case. 
The consumer surplus (in case of perfect competition) is the curvilinear triangle 
area FB p , namely: 
Sd,c= QpdQ)Q(p
Q
0
  
Similarly, the excess monopolist (in case of perfect competition) is the curvilinear 
triangle area p BD: 
Ss,c= 
Q
0
dQ)Q(CmQp  
The total surplus (in case of perfect competition) is the sum of the two surpluses, 
namely: 
Sc=Sd,c+Ss,c=   
Q
0
dQ)Q(Cm)Q(p  
Let notice now that since the optimum in monopoly conditions is performed on the 
descending curve of the CTM and in the perfect competition on the increase, 
resulting: Q0 Q . 
The area of the curvilinear triangle ABC is called allocative inefficiency and we 
have: 
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 107 
Ia=   
Q
Q0
dQ)Q(Cm)Q(p =Sc-Sm 
Because on the action area of the manufacturer: p(Q)Cm(Q) we have that Ia0 
therefore: ScSm. From these facts, the total surplus under monopoly is smaller or 
equal than in the case of perfect competition. Also, let note that: 
Ss=Ss,m-Ss,c= 

















 
Q
0
Q
0
0
* dQ)Q(CmQpdQ)Q(CmQp
0
= 
Q
Q
0
*
0
dQ)Q(CmQpQp  
is the difference of producer’s surplus at the transition from perfect competition at 
the monopolistic competition. 
On the other hand, p( Q )= p =Cm( Q ), and p
*
=p(Q0) where Q0 satisfy: 
Cm(Q0)=p’(Q0)Q0+p(Q0). We get so: 
Ss= 
Q
Q
00
0
dQ)Q(CmQ)Q(pQ)Q(p = 
Q
Q
00
0
dQ)Q('CTQ)Q(pQ)Q(p = 
)Q(CT)Q(CTQ)Q(pQ)Q(p 000  =   



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

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)Q(CT)Q(CT
)Q(pQ)Q(pQ
1)Q(CT)Q(CT
0
00
0  
From the Cauchy's theorem of finite increases, it follows that Q**  Q,Q0  so 
that: 
 
**QQ
0
00
)Q('CT
')Q(pQ
)Q(CT)Q(CT
)Q(pQ)Q(pQ





=
)Q(Cm
)Q('pQ)Q(p
**
****** 
=
)Q(Cm
)Q(Vm
**
**
 
Following these considerations, it follows: 
Ss=   







)Q(Cm
)Q(Vm
1)Q(CT)Q(CT
**
**
0 = 
  
)Q(Cm
)Q(Vm)Q(Cm)Q(CT)Q(CT
**
****
0  0 
because the total cost is increasing, CmVm on the range  Q,Q0  and Cm is 
positive. Therefore, the shift to a monopoly, will increase the producer surplus. 
Analogously: 
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Sd=Sd,m-Sd,c= 




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
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Q
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Q
Q
0
*
0
dQ)Q(pQpQp  
represents the difference of consumer’s surplus is at the transition from perfect 
competition at those monopolistic. 
We therefore have: 
Sd= 
Q
Q
0
*
0
dQ)Q(pQpQp = 
Q
Q
00
0
dQ)Q(pQ)Q(pQ)Q(p  
Let P be a primitive of p. We get: 
Sd= 
Q
Q
00
0
dQ)Q('PQ)Q(pQ)Q(p = )Q(P)Q(PQ)Q(pQ)Q(p 000  =
  


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)Q(P)Q(P
)Q(pQ)Q(pQ
)Q(P)Q(P
0
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0 . 
From Cauchy's theorem of finite increases, it follows that Q***  Q,Q0  so that: 
 
***QQ
0
00
)Q(p
')Q(pQ
)Q(P)Q(P
)Q(pQ)Q(pQ
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



=
)Q(p
)Q('pQ)Q(p
***
********* 
=
)Q(p
)Q(Vm
***
***
 
Finally: 
Sd=   






 1
)Q(p
)Q(Vm
)Q(P)Q(P
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0 =
  
)Q(p
)Q(p)Q(Vm)Q(P)Q(P
***
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0  0 
because the demand function being convex (for normal goods) it follows P’=p”0 
therefore )Q(P)Q(P 0  and )Q(Vm)Q(p
******  . 
Therefore, the shift to a monopoly will reduce consumer surplus. 
 
3. Price Discriminations 
In the monopoly situation, we saw that, unlike in the case of perfect competition, 
the monopoly does not produce at full capacity (marginal cost equal to the inverse 
function of the demand) phenomenon that leads to inefficiency allowance. 
What happens when the sale takes place at different prices to different quantities? 
We call such a situation by price discrimination. 
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3.1. Discrimination of first order 
In this case (also called perfect discrimination), the monopolist sells each buyer at 
the maximum price that he can bear it. Production will rise so that the marginal 
cost is equal to the opposite level of the demand. 
If the sale price would be strictly higher than marginal cost, then (as it is 
increasing) the monopolist will produce until additional amount will satisfy the 
above condition. Following these findings, the monopolist will sell the last unit 
produced (those corresponding to the maximum marginal cost) to the buyer which 
offers the highest price, the penultimate to the second (in decreasing order of price 
offered) and so further. 
3.2. Discrimination of second order 
In this type of discrimination, the monopolist practice different prices depending on 
the amount requested. In this case, the price equals the marginal cost of the last 
units purchased (which has the highest marginal cost), on the grounds that if the 
next unit of product would be priced lower than the previous one, then the buyer 
will prefer to buy the additional unit increasing the surplus. 
3.3. Discrimination of third order 
In this type of discrimination, the monopolist use distinct prices for different 
groups of consumers. 
Let consider the situation where a monopolist operate on a number of “n” 
consumer groups, selling the quantities Q1,...,Qn at prices p1(Q1),...,pn(Qn) where 
Q1+...+Qn=Q is the total production achieved. 
In this case, the monopolist profit is: 
(Q1,...,Qn)= )Q...Q(CTQ)Q(p n1
n
1i
iii 

 
The extreme condition requires like necessary the cancellation of first order partial 
derivatives: 
iQ

=0 i= n,1  therefore: 
)Q(Cm)Q(pQ)Q(p iiii
'
i  =0 i= n,1  
Considering now the coefficient of elasticity of demand for the group “i” in 
relation to the price pi: 
ii p,Q
 =
i
i
i
i
Q
p
dp
dQ
 =
ii
'
i
ii
Q)Q(p
)Q(p
 we get: 
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




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



ii p,Q
ii
1
1)Q(p)Q(Cm  i= n,1  
Therefore, the necessary condition to maximize profit will be reduced to the 
condition of marginal revenue equal marginal cost for each group of the entire 
production. Also, from the above relationship, it provided compatibility groups 
namely: 




















nn11 p,Q
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p,Q
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1
1)Q(p...
1
1)Q(p  
Considering two arbitrary groups “i” and “j” we have first: 
ii
jj
p,Q
p,Q
jj
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1
1
1
1
)Q(p
)Q(p




  
and after: 













ii
jjii
jjii
p,Q
p,Qp,Q
p,Qp,Q
jj
jjii
1
1
)Q(p
)Q(p)Q(p
 
Because the monopolist acts only in the zone of elasticity of demand in relation to 
price, we have 
ii p,Q
1
1

  and 
ii p,Q
 ,
jj p,Q
 0. 
We have therefore:   
jjii p,Qp,Qjjii
)Q(p)Q(p  0. If (taking into account the 
fact that elasticities are negative) 
jjii p,Qp,Q
  then pi(Qi)pj(Qj) so the 
monopolist must sell at a higher price to the group “i”. Conversely, if 
jjii p,Qp,Q
  
then pi(Qi)pj(Qj) so the monopolist must sell at a lower price to the group “i”. It is 
obvious that at equal elasticities will correspond to equal prices. 
Following these considerations, it follows that if (after a possible renumbering) 
nn2211 p,Qp,Qp,Q
...   then: p1(Q1)p2(Q2)...pn(Qn). 
We intend now to study the decision of the monopolist to sell at the same price to 
the “n” groups compared with the application of differentiated pricing. 
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We have seen that: 










p,Q
1
1)Q(p)Q(Cm  where Q=Q1+...+Qn and for 
differentiated prices: 









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ii p,Q
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1
1)Q(p)Q(Cm  i= n,1 . 
From above, we get: 









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





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
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p,Qp,Q
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1)Q(p
1
1)Q(p
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from where: 
ii p,Q
p,Q
ii 1
1
1
1
)Q(p)Q(p




  i= n,1  
The monopolist profit is therefore: 
n=(Q1,...,Qn)= )Q(CTQ)Q(p
n
1i
iii 

= )Q(CTQ
1
1
1
1
)Q(p
n
1i
i
p,Q
p,Q
ii







 
For a single price, we have: 
=(Q)=p(Q)Q-CT(Q) 
Calculating the difference between the two profits, results: 
n-= )Q(CTQ
1
1
1
1
)Q(p
n
1i
i
p,Q
p,Q
ii







-(p(Q)Q-CT(Q))=  



















n
1i
ii
p,Q
p,Q
Q)Q(pQ
1
1
1
1
)Q(p
ii
=   
n
1i p,Qp,Q
p,Qp,Q
i
1
Q)Q(p
ii
ii . 
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Let f(x)=
 1x
x
p,Q
p,Q


. We have f’(x)=
 2
p,Q
p,Q
1x
1


0 so f is strictly increasing. We 
have )x(flim
x 
=
p,Q
1

, )x(flim
1x
1x


=, f(x)=0x=
p,Q
 , )x(flim
1x
1x


=-, f(0)=-1. 
For x=
ii p,Q
 -1, it follows: f(
ii p,Q
 )0 if 
ii p,Q
 
p,Q
  and f(
ii p,Q
 )0 if 
ii p,Q
 
p,Q
 . If 
ii p,Q
 =
p,Q
  then f(
ii p,Q
 )=0. 
Let I=  p,Qp,Q iin,1i  , J= p,Qp,Q jjn,1j  . With these notations, we have: 
n-=      




Jj p,Qp,Q
p,Qp,Q
j
Ii p,Qp,Q
p,Qp,Q
i
1
Q)Q(p
1
Q)Q(p
jj
jj
ii
ii  
From the above, it follows that the first sum is strictly negative and the second 
strictly positive. 
We summarize those obtained as follows: if the loss of profit on groups where the 
elasticity is less than the overall is less than plus achieved by the groups where the 
elasticity is greater than the global then the monopolist will agree separate selling 
prices. Similarly, if the loss of profit on groups where the elasticity is less than the 
overall is greater than the plus achieved by the groups where the elasticity is 
greater than the overall, then the monopolist would prefer selling its product at a 
single price. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The above analysis allowed the determination in general of the consumer’s surplus 
or of the manufacturer’s surplus in the case of monopoly and the determination of 
the allocative inefficiency in relation to the situation of perfect competition. 
In the second part, we broached the price discrimination of third order, analyzing, 
in terms of goods elasticities, the opportunity to separate prices in the conditions of 
differences existing between groups of firms. 
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